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Commentary/Redish et al.: A unified framework for addiction 
our understanding of a variety of psychiatric disorders. In the spirit of 
reflecting on the significance and scope of their research, I briefly 
develop the idea that their framework can also contribute to improving 
our understanding of the pervasive problem of procrastination. 
Starting from the idea that addiction involves "the continued 
making of maladaptive choices, even in the face of the explicitly 
stated desire to make a different choice" (target article, sect. 1), 
Redish et al. seek to develop a unified framework for addiction 
by (1) focusing on research concerning action selection and 
decision making, and (2) identifying failure points in our 
de~ision-making system. As they suggest, this approach may be 
frUitful for understanding not just addiction, but a variety of psy-
chiatric disorders. I suspect that they are correct, and I want to 
develop a somewhat different but related suggestion, namely, 
that their approach can contribute to an improved understanding 
of the pervasive problem of procrastination. 
Although procrastination is more common than addiction, it 
can figure as a crucial obstacle to realizing intentions to quit 
engaging in harmful addictive behavior. This fits neatly with 
the plausible conception of procrastination according to which 
it involves putting off an action that one should, given one's 
ends and information, perform promptly. 
Even more so than addiction, which is still popularly cast as, at 
least in part, the product of powerful cravings that disable agents 
from acting voluntarily and in accordance with their decisions, 
procrastination is generally assumed to be the product of volun-
tary choices, and so the failures-in-decision-making approach 
th~t Re~ish et al. employ in their work seems particularly appro-
pnate Wlth respect to understanding procrastination. What better 
place to look for an understanding of self-defeating but voluntary 
delays than in research on failure points in our decision-making 
system? 
The most established model of procrastination connects pro-
crastination to problematic discounting processes (O'Donoghue 
& Rabin 1999a; 1999b; 2001), which is one of the vulnerabilities 
that Redish et al. discuss in their work. Like other animals, 
humans seem to discount future utility in a way that sometimes 
prompts preference reversals (Ainslie 2001; Kirby & Herrnstein 
1995; Millar & Navarick 1984; Solnick et al. 1980). This can result 
in an agent's voluntary acting in a way that he or she planned 
against and will come to regret. The agent may, for example, 
keep making exceptions to his or her ongoing plan to cut down 
on indulgent purchases in order to save money for retirement. 
Discounting-induced preference reversals can thus foster 
procrastination. 
A recent, complementary model of procrastination focuses on 
another vulnerability, one that is not directly discussed by 
Redish et al. but fits very well with their approach, namely, 
our vulnerability to intransitive preferences (Andreou 2007). 
Intransitive preferences (where, in particular, one cannot rank 
a set of options from most preferred to least preferred 
because there is a circularity in one's preferences) are often 
prompted by choice situations in which indulgences with indi-
vidually negligible effects (such as smoking a cigarette) have 
momentous cumulative effects. Consider an agent who enjoys 
smoking but also values decent health. Someone in this situ-
ation may prefer, for all n, quitting after n + 1 cigarettes to 
quitting after n cigarettes, but also prefer quitting after a rela-
tively low number of cigarettes to quitting after a very high 
number of cigarettes. This agent has intransitive preferences, 
and is vulnerable to intransitivity-induced procrastination 
(Andreou 2005). 
Other interesting ideas concerning procrastination might fit 
comfortably within and be illuminated by Redish et al.'s frame-
work. Consider, for example, the familiar idea that procrastina-
tion may be prompted by fear of failure, which may, in different 
cases, be the product of different vulnerabilities. For example, 
in some cases, fear of failure may result from the overvaluation 
of the expected value of stability; while in other cases, it may 
result from excessively (and perhaps obsessively) focusing on 
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one possible outcome rather than appropriately distributing 
one's attention over the range of outcomes associated with a 
situation. 
Consider next the idea that procrastination is strongly associ-
ated with the pursuit of "ephemeral pleasures" and "ephemeral 
chores" (Silver & Sabini 1981). Ephemeral pleasures and 
ephemeral chores are often more immediately gratifying or at 
least less aversive than the goal-directed actions that are 
called for by long-term projects. Moreover, ephemeral plea-
sures and ephemeral chores are often individually compatible 
with one's long-term projects, though they can accumulate in 
a way that interferes with these projects. These points suggest 
a connection between procrastination mediated by the pursuit 
of ephemeral pleasures and ephemeral chores, on the one 
hand, and problematic discounting processes or intransitive 
preferences, on the other. 
The vulnerabilities I have been focusing on are vulnerabil-
ities in the planning system, which is only one part of our 
decision-making system. As Redish et al. stress, problematic 
decisions can also result from vulnerabilities in the habit 
system or from vulnerabilities in the interaction of the planning 
system and the habit system. In the case of procrastination, it 
seems clear that planning-based vulnerabilities can foster 
habit-based vulnerabilities as well. If, for example, one's intran-
sitive preferences prompt one to repeat individually negligible 
but cumulatively destructive actions, a habit-based vulnerability 
may flourish atop one's planning-based vulnerability. Soon 
enough, automatic indulgence will replace rationalized 
indulgence. 
Relatedly, coping with procrastination often involves dealing 
with both planning-based vulnerabilities and habit-based 
vulnerabilities. Again, consider the agent whose intransitive 
preferences prompt intransitivity-induced procrastination. 
Once the agent's problematic indulgences are supported by 
habit as well, overcoming procrastination will involve (1) 
dealing with the planning system failure by, for example, adopt-
ing a plan that draws some bright lines in order to stop oneself 
from sliding down the slippery slope along a self-destructive 
path; and (2) overhauling one's habits so that acting accordingly 
becomes second nature. 
In short, in addition to contributing to our understanding of 
addiction, Redish et al.'s failures-in-decision-making approach 
is suggestive with respect to the related, but more pervasive 
problem of procrastination. Indeed, it is probably less contro-
:ersial t~ propose that the approach is well suited to provid-
mg a umfied framework for procrastination than to propose 
that it is well suited to providing a unified framework for 
addiction. 
